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Introduction	  
Hedge	  funds	  have	  exploded	  into	  prominence	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  with	  global	  assets	  under	  
management	   growing	   fifty-­‐fold	   between	  1990	   and	   2007,	   reaching	   approximately	   $2	   trillion	   in	  
2007	  (Commission	  2008).	  In	  recent	  years,	  trading	  by	  hedge	  funds	  has	  accounted	  for	  over	  50	  per	  
cent	  of	  the	  daily	  trading	  volume	  in	  equities	  markets.	  Hedge	  funds	  have	  become	  crucial	  providers	  
of	  liquidity	  and	  drivers	  of	  price	  formation	  in	  global	  financial	  markets.	  	  
Prior	   to	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis,	   hedge	   funds	   had	   come	   under	   the	   spotlight	   for	   promoting	  
herding	  behaviour	  during	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  of	  1997.	   In	  the	  following	  year,	  the	  failure	  of	  
the	   American	   hedge	   fund	   Long-­‐Term	   Capital	   Management	   (LTCM)	   highlighted	   the	   potential	  
systemic	  repercussions	  ensuing	  from	  the	  failure	  of	  large	  hedge	  funds.	  In	  Europe,	  episodes	  such	  
as	   the	   failed	  merger	  between	  the	  Deutsche	  Börse	  and	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange	  highlighted	  
the	   potential	   disruptive	   effects	   that	   hedge	   funds	   can	   have	   on	   corporate	   governance	   in	  
continental	  European	  countries,	  first	  and	  foremost	  in	  Germany	  (The	  Economist,	  23	  April	  2005).	  	  
The	  global	  financial	  crisis	  that	  began	  in	  2007	  brought	  new	  urgency	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  regulating	  
hedge	  funds.	  Although	  hedge	  funds	  were	  not	  the	  main	  cause	  of	  the	  crisis	  (Brunnermeier	  et	  al.	  
2009;	   de	   Larosière	   Group	   2009),	   they	   did	   play	   a	   part	   in	   its	   worsening,	   mainly	   through	   the	  
massive	   selling	  of	   shares	   and	   short-­‐selling	   transactions	   (Group	  of	   Thirty	   2009;	   FSA	  2009).	   The	  
large-­‐scale	   fraud	   perpetrated	   by	   Bernard	   Madoff’s	   hedge	   funds	   had	   considerable	   political	  
resonance	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  USA	  and	  further	  intensified	  the	  debate	  on	  regulation.	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This	   chapter	   analyses	   the	  EU	  and	   the	   international	   regulation	  of	  hedge	   funds,	   addressing	   two	  
key	   questions	   posed	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   volume:	   how	  have	   European	   and	   global	   rules	  
influenced	  each	  other	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day?	  And	  which	  factors	   inform	  the	  global	   influence	  of	  
European	  regulatory	  efforts	  and	  the	  relevance	  of	  global	  initiatives	  for	  European	  rules?	  We	  find	  
that	   the	  absence	  of	  agreement	  at	   the	  EU	   level	  has	  weakened	  the	  EU’s	  position	   internationally	  
and	  increased	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  USA	  in	  EU	  policy-­‐making.	  The	  differences	  within	  the	  EU	  owe	  
principally	   to	   different	   financial	   systems.	   Countries	   with	  many	   hedge	   fund	  managers	   (the	   UK	  
and,	   to	   a	   less	   extent,	   Sweden)	   were	   the	   most	   cautious	   regarding	   EU	   legislation,	   while	   the	  
lobbying	  of	  financial	  services	  firms	  contributed	  to	  national	  positioning.	  	  
The	  main	   legislative	   response	   to	   the	   international	   financial	   crisis	   concerning	   hedge	   funds	   has	  
been	   the	   EU’s	   Alternative	   Investment	   Fund	   Managers	   Directive	   (AIFMD).	   Proposed	   by	   the	  
Commission	  in	  April	  2009	  (EC	  2009a)	  and	  agreed	  at	  the	  December	  2010	  European	  Council,	  it	  was	  
formally	  adopted	  in	  June	  2011	  (EC	  2011)	  with	  a	  deadline	  to	  transpose	  into	  national	  legislation	  by	  
22	   July	   2013.	   The	   AIFMD’s	   ‘third	   country’	   provisions	   raised	   the	   question	   of	   ‘equivalence’	   and	  
sparked	  the	  direct	  intervention	  of	  the	  US	  federal	  administration—opposed	  to	  the	  export	  of	  EU	  
norms	   in	   this	   area—into	   the	   EU	   policy-­‐making	   process.	   Although	   the	   original	   ‘third	   country’	  
provisions	   proposed	   by	   the	   Commission	   were	   significantly	   watered	   down	   in	   the	   adopted	  
directive,	   questions	   remained	   about	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   eleven	   conditions	   that	   non-­‐EU-­‐based	  
funds	  and	  fund	  managers	  would	  have	  to	  meet	  in	  order	  to	  access	  the	  EU	  passport.	  The	  delay	  on	  
Level	  2	  implementing	  regulation,	  published	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  December	  2012,	  contributed	  
to	  on-­‐going	  debate	  and	  consternation	  over	  the	  international	  impact	  of	  AIFMD.	  
The	   chapter	   is	   structured	   as	   follows.	   The	   remainder	   of	   this	   introduction	   outlines	   some	   key	  
concepts	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  hedge	  funds.	  Sections	  2	  and	  3	  outline,	  respectively,	  the	  regulation	  
of	  hedge	  funds	  internationally	  and	  in	  the	  EU,	  before	  and	  after	  the	  crisis.	  Section	  4	  discusses	  the	  
debate	  surrounding	  third	  country	  access	  resulting	  from	  the	  AIFMD.	  Section	  5	  concludes	  with	  an	  
overall	  assessment.	  	  
Some	  key	  concepts	  concerning	  hedge	  fund	  regulation	  
How	  to	  define	  a	  hedge	  fund	   is	  controversial,	  with	   jurisdictions	  employing	  different	  definitions.	  
The	  International	  Organization	  of	  Securities	  Commission	  (IOSCO),	  the	  international	  body	  whose	  
regulatory	   remit	   covers	   hedge	   funds—has	   been	   unable	   to	   produce	   a	   common	   or	   shared	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definition,	   noting	   that	   ‘each	   jurisdiction	   has	   views	   on	  what	   a	   hedge	   fund	   is’	   (IOSCO	  2006:	   9).	  
Generally	   speaking,	   hedge	   funds	   tend	   to	   have	   the	   following	   characteristics	   (EC	   2008;	   IOSCO	  
2009):	   (1)	   they	   focus	   on	   the	   delivery	   of	   absolute	   returns;	   (2)	   their	   investment	   strategies	   are	  
typically	   based	  on	   a	   relatively	   high	   and	   systematic	   use	   of	   leverage	   (they	   are	   often	   defined	   as	  
‘highly	  leveraged	  institutions’,	  see	  for	  example	  BCBS	  1999a,b)	  through	  borrowing,	  short-­‐selling,2	  
and	  derivatives	  positions;	  (3)	  their	  investor	  base	  has	  traditionally	  been	  confined	  to	  institutional	  
or	  other	  sophisticated	  investors;	  (4)	  significant	  performance	  fees	  (for	  instance,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
percentage	  of	  profits)	  are	  paid	  to	  the	  manager	   in	  addition	  to	  an	  annual	  management	  fee;	  and	  
(5)	  managers	   often	   have	   their	   ‘own	   funds’	   invested.	   Unlike	   private	   equity	   firms,	   hedge	   funds	  
tend	   to	   invest	   in	   liquid	   securities	   rather	   than	   long-­‐term	   illiquid	  assets	  and	  do	  not	   intervene	   in	  
the	  management	  of	  companies	   in	  which	  they	   invest.	  Prior	  to	  the	  crisis,	  hedge	  funds	  tended	  to	  
be	  ‘unregulated’.	  Indeed,	  the	  IOSCO	  task	  force	  analysing	  regulatory	  options	  for	  hedge	  funds	  was	  
named	  the	  ‘Task	  Force	  on	  Unregulated	  Entities’.	  	  
The	  main	  actors	  in	  the	  hedge	  funds	  business	  are	  the	  hedge	  fund	  manager,	  the	  fund	  itself	  (often	  
legally	  distinct	   from	   the	  manager),	   the	   fund’s	  administrator	   (responsible	   for	  processing	   trades	  
and	  valuing	  assets),	  and	  the	  prime	  brokers	  (investment	  banks	  and	  securities	  firms)	  which	  act	  as	  
settlement	   agents,	   have	   custody	   over	   assets,	   and	   provide	   financing	   (EC	   2008;	   FSA	   2005).	  
Although	   it	   depends	   on	   the	   jurisdiction,	   hedge	   fund	  managers	   and	   prime	   brokers	   tend	   to	   be	  
regulated,	  at	  least	  in	  Europe.	  
Hedge	  funds	  are	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘unregulated’	  financial	  entities,	  even	  though	  this	  definition	  
is	  only	  partially	  correct.	  First,	  one	  should	  distinguish	  between	  the	  direct	  and	  indirect	  regulation	  
of	   hedge	   funds.	   Indirect	   regulation	   entails	   regulation	  of	   the	   financial	   institutions	   that	   interact	  
with	   hedge	   funds,	   in	   particular	   the	   prime	   brokers	   through	   which	   hedge	   funds	   operate	   in	  
securities	  markets,	  and	  banks	  (in	  particular	   investment	  banks)	   investing	   in	  or	   lending	  to	  hedge	  
funds.	   Second,	  one	   should	  distinguish	  between	   the	   regulation	  of	  hedge	   funds,	  many	  of	  which	  
are	  located	  offshore	  and	  thus	  cannot	  be	  regulated,	  and	  the	  regulation	  of	  fund	  managers	  in	  the	  
jurisdiction	  in	  which	  they	  are	  based.	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Regulating	  hedge	  funds	  internationally	  
Prior	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  turmoil,	  research	  and	  fact	  finding	  on	  hedge	  funds	  was	  undertaken	  by	  
international	   financial	   regulatory	   fora,	   generally	   following	   policy	   failures.	   After	   the	   Asian	  
financial	  crisis	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  hedge	  fund	  LTCM	  in	  the	  USA,	  a	  set	  of	  policy	  documents	  
were	   issued	   by	   the	   Basel	   Committee	   on	   Banking	   Supervision	   (BCBS)	   (1999a,b),	   IOSCO	   (1999),	  
and	  subsequently	  by	  the	  newly	  created	  Financial	  Stability	  Forum	  (FSF)	  (2000,	  updated	  in	  2007,	  
when	  the	  first	  signs	  of	  the	  crisis	  emerged).	  The	  USA	  also	  conducted	  its	  own	  review	  through	  the	  
President’s	  Working	  Group	   (PWG)	  on	   Financial	  Markets	   (1999).	   Basically,	   all	   these	  documents	  
concluded	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  indirect	  regulation	  of	  hedge	  funds,	  which	  was	  indeed	  strengthened.	  	  
In	   policy	   discussions	   in	   international	   fora,	   two	   different	   approaches	   were	   apparent:	   one	   in	  
favour	   of	   direct	   regulation	   supported	   by	   Germany	   and	   France,	   and	   the	   other	   resisting	   such	  
regulation	  supported	  by	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  UK	  (interviews,	  Basel,	  November	  2008,	  Madrid,	  March	  
2009;	  Fioretos	  2010).	  In	  2007,	  German	  officials	  used	  their	  presidency	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  of	  the	  G8	  to	  
push	  for	  direct	  regulation;	  they	  receiving	  some	  backing	  from	  the	  FSF,	  which	  the	  G8	  had	  charged	  
with	  studying	  the	  issue.3	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  the	  German	  finance	  minister	  
Peer	  Steinbrück	  called	  for	  a	  formal	  code	  of	  conduct	  for	  hedge	  funds.	  The	  USA	  opposed	  a	  code	  of	  
conduct,	  while	   the	  US	   Treasury	   secretary	  Henry	   Paulson	   Jr.	   supported	   a	   set	   of	   principles	   that	  
informed	   investors,	   leaving	   them	   to	  monitor	   risk	   (International	  Herald	   Tribune,	  23	  April	   2007;	  
Bloomberg	  News,	  23	  April	  2007).	  An	  impasse	  followed	  and	  no	  action	  was	  taken	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  
problems	  posed	  by	  hedge	  and	  private-­‐equity	  funds.	  	  
However,	  in	  2007	  the	  FSF	  called	  on	  the	  hedge	  fund	  industry	  to	  develop	  a	  code	  of	  best	  practices.	  
In	   response,	   several	   standards	   were	   issued	   by	   private	   sector	   bodies	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   US	  
jurisdictions:	   the	   Hedge	   Fund	   Working	   Group	   (HFWG)/Hedge	   Fund	   Standards	   Board	   (HFSB)	  
(2008)	  and	  the	  alternative	  investment	  industry	  association	  (AIMA)	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  the	  Managed	  
Funds	   Association	   (MFA)	   based	   in	   the	   USA	   (2007).	   Their	   recommendations	   covered	   sound	  
practices	   for	   hedge	   fund	  governance,	   transparency,	   and	  processes	   and	  methodologies	   for	   the	  
valuation	  of	  hedge	  fund	  portfolios.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Previously,	  in	  July	  2005,	  then	  Chancellor	  of	  Germany	  Gerhard	  Schröder,	  a	  Social	  Democrat,	  had	  pressed	  
for	  tighter	  controls	  on	  hedge	  funds	  at	  the	  G7	  summit	  in	  Britain,	  where	  it	  was	  blocked	  by	  ‘Wall	  Street	  and	  
London’	  (Schröder	  in	  The	  Independent,	  16	  June	  2005).	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After	   the	  eruption	  of	   the	  global	   financial	  crisis,	   the	   international	  division	  over	  how	  to	  regulate	  
hedge	   funds	   re-­‐emerged	   in	   preparations	   for	   the	   April	   2009	   G20	   summit.	   Several	   European	  
countries,	   led	   by	   France	   and	   Germany	   and	   supported	   by	   Italy	   (Reuters,	   11	   October	   2008),	  
pushed	  for	  a	  tougher	  regulatory	  regime	  and	  for	  hedge	  funds	  to	  be	  overseen	  similarly	  to	  banks	  
(Financial	  Times,	  23	  February	  2009;	  Quaglia	  2011).	  In	  contrast,	  US	  and	  UK	  authorities	  favoured	  
greater	  disclosure	  over	  more	  regulation,	  proposing	  that	  hedge	  funds	  be	  required	  to	  register	  with	  
the	  government	  and	  disclose	  additional	  information	  with	  a	  view	  to	  increase	  transparency	  (Wall	  
Street	  Journal,	  14	  March	  2009).	  European	  leaders	  also	  wanted	  to	  clamp	  down	  on	  tax	  havens.	  	  
In	   February	   2009,	   German	   Chancellor	   Angela	   Merkel	   hosted	   a	   summit	   of	   German,	   French,	  
Italian,	   Spanish,	   Dutch,	   and	   British	   leaders	   in	   Berlin.	   The	   purpose	   of	   the	   gathering	   was	   to	  
prepare	   a	   common	   EU	   policy	   in	   advance	   of	   London's	   G20	   summit	   in	   April	   2009.	   The	   press	  
statement	   issued	   after	   the	   meeting	   pointed	   out	   that	   ‘all	   financial	   markets,	   products	   and	  
participants	   must	   be	   subject	   to	   appropriate	   oversight	   or	   regulation,	   without	   exception	   and	  
regardless	  of	  their	  country	  of	  domicile.	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  for	  those	  private	  pools	  of	  capital,	  
including	  hedge	  funds,	  that	  may	  present	  a	  systemic	  risk.’4	  The	  consensus	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  victory	  
for	   France	   and	   Germany	   which	   had	   championed	   a	   comprehensive	   regulatory	   architecture	  
(Financial	   Times,	   23	   February	   2009).	   The	   UK	   Chancellor	   of	   the	   Exchequer	   Gordon	   Brown	  
reportedly	  agreed	  to	  restrictions	  on	  hedge	  funds	  to	  clear	  the	  way	  for	  an	  overall	  accord,	  which	  
included	   strengthening	   the	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	   (The	   Daily	   Telegraph,	   23	   February	  
2009).	  
A	   joint	   letter	   from	   French	   President	   Nicolas	   Sarkozy	   and	   German	   Chancellor	   Angela	   Merkel	  
(2009)	  to	  the	  EU	  Council	  President	  Mirek	  Topolanek	  and	  President	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  
Jose	  Manuel	  Barroso	   in	  preparation	   for	   the	  G20	  Summit	   in	  April	  2009	  reiterated	   the	  goal	  of	  a	  
joint	  EU	  position	  on	  the	  ‘appropriate	  registration,	  regulation,	  and	  oversight’	  of	  hedge	  funds	  and	  
other	  funds	  presenting	  potential	  systemic	  risk.	  After	  protracted	  negotiations,	  the	  G20	  in	  London	  
in	  April	  2009	  agreed	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  http://www.diplo.de/diplo/en/WillkommeninD/D-­‐Informationen/Nachrichten/090224-­‐1.html	  (accessed	  
May	  2009).	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hedge	  funds	  or	  their	  managers	  will	  be	  registered	  and	  will	  be	  required	  
to	  disclose	  appropriate	  information	  on	  an	  ongoing	  basis	  to	  supervisors	  
or	  regulators,	  including	  on	  their	  leverage,	  necessary	  for	  assessment	  of	  
the	   systemic	   risks	   that	   they	   pose	   individually	   or	   collectively.	   Where	  
appropriate,	   registration	   should	   be	   subject	   to	   a	   minimum	   size.	   They	  
will	   be	   subject	   to	   oversight	   to	   ensure	   that	   they	   have	   adequate	   risk	  
management….	  
Following	  the	  G20	  recommendations,	   IOSCO	  published	  a	  report	  (2009)	  containing	  some	  rather	  
general	   recommendations	   on	   the	   regulation	   of	   hedge	   funds.	   During	   preparatory	   discussions,	  
participants—member	  state	  regulators—had	  been	  unable	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  fundamental	  issue	  of	  
whether	   the	   hedge	   fund	   or	   the	   hedge	   fund	   manager	   should	   be	   regulated,	   as	   there	   were	  
different	   views	   and	   legislation	   in	   place	   in	   the	   participating	   jurisdictions	   (interview,	   Madrid,	  
March	  2009).	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  IOSCO	  report	  left	  this	  issue	  ambiguous.	  	  
Since	   2009,	   hedge	   fund	   managers	   based	   in	   the	   USA	   have	   been	   working	   on	   new	   industry	  
standards	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  President	  Working	  Group	  (PWG).	  The	  PWG	  contained	  two	  
separate	  committees:	  the	  Asset	  Managers’	  Committee	  made	  up	  of	  institutional	  alternative	  asset	  
managers	  representing	  diverse	  perspectives	  charged	  with	  developing	  guidelines	  that	  define	  best	  
practices	   for	   the	   hedge	   fund	   industry	   (Asset	   Managers	   Committee	   2009),	   and	   the	   Investors	  
Committee,	  which	  also	  issued	  a	  set	  of	  best	  practice	  standards	  to	  reduce	  systemic	  risk	  and	  foster	  
investor	  protection	  (Investors	  Committee	  2009).	  Under	  the	  aegis	  of	  IOSCO,	  industry	  associations	  
have	   worked	   together	   to	   produce	   a	   single	   summary	   standards	   document,	   the	   Hedge	   Fund	  
Matrix.5	  
EU	  regulation	  of	  hedge	  funds	  
Prior	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  hedge	  funds	  (and	  fund	  managers)	  were	  not	  regulated	  at	  the	  
EU	  level	  (Lutton	  2008).	  But	  hedge	  funds,	  or	  more	  precisely	  some	  of	  their	  activities,	  were	  subject	  
to	   EU	   legislation,	   notably	   the	   Markets	   in	   Financial	   Instruments	   Directive	   (MIFID),	   the	  
Transparency	   Directive,	   and	   the	   Market	   Abuse	   Directive.	   Some	   prudential	   reporting	   to	  
supervisors	  was	  required	  by	  a	  European	  Central	  Bank	  (ECB)	  regulation	  concerning	  statistics	  on	  
the	  assets	  and	  liabilities	  of	  investment	  funds.	  According	  to	  this	  regulation,	  issued	  in	  2007	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  http://www.hedgefundmatrix.com/	  (accessed	  August	  2009).	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early	  stages	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  all	  investment	  funds	  in	  the	  EU,	  including	  hedge	  funds,	  
had	  to	  provide	  certain	   information	  to	  national	  central	  banks.	  At	  the	  national	   level,	  hedge	  fund	  
managers	   were	   regulated	   entities	   in	   some	   member	   states	   though	   not	   subject	   to	   specific	  
legislation.	   In	  other	  words,	   they	  were	  regulated	  as	   ‘normal’	   fund	  managers.	   In	  other	  countries	  
such	   as	   France,	   Italy,	   Spain,	   and	   Germany,	   the	   fund	   itself	   was	   a	   regulated	   onshore	   vehicle	  
(IOSCO	  2006,	  2009),	  though	  often	  it	  was	  domiciled	  in	  a	  third	  country.	  	  
Since	   the	   early	   2000s,	   some	   EU	   member	   states,	   most	   notably	   Germany,	   as	   well	   as	   some	  
members	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  (see	  e.g.	  the	  Kaforis	  report)	  had	  encouraged	  discussion	  on	  
the	  regulation	  of	  hedge	  funds	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  Partly	  to	  assuage	  these	  concerns,	  the	  Commission	  
set	  up	  a	  group	  of	  experts—the	  Alternative	  Investment	  Expert	  Group—to	  discuss	  the	  issue.	  The	  
group,	   which	   included	   several	   hedge	   funds	   managers	   and	   other	   alternative	   investment	   fund	  
managers	   (AIFMs)	   amongst	   its	   members,	   issued	   a	   report	   in	   2006,	  Managing,	   Servicing	   and	  
Marketing	   Hedge	   Funds	   in	   Europe,	   which	   concluded	   against	   EU	   legislation	   on	   hedge	   funds	  
(2006).	  The	   issue	  was	  raised	  again	  by	  the	  German	  presidency	  of	  the	  EU	   in	  2007	  and	  during	   its	  
hosting	   of	   the	   G8	   summit	   (The	   Economist,	   26	  May	   2007)	   but	  with	   scant	   support	   (interviews,	  
Berlin,	  April	  2008).	  	  
In	   the	   past,	   the	   Commission,	   notably	   the	   Commissioner	   for	   the	   Internal	   Market	   Charles	  
McCreevy,	  had	  ruled	  out	  EU	  legislation	  on	  hedge	  funds.	  According	  to	  several	   interviewees,	  the	  
Barroso	  Commission	  and	  Commissioner	  McCreevy	  in	  particular	  favoured	  the	  ‘better	  regulation’	  
of	  financial	  services,	  which	  often	  meant	  ‘light	  touch’	  regulation	  or	  no	  regulation	  at	  all,	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  hedge	  funds	  and	  credit	  rating	  agencies	  (interviews,	  Brussels	  June	  2007,	  Paris	  July	  2007,	  
Rome	  December	  2007).	  But	   the	  global	   financial	  crisis	   shifted	  the	  political	  dynamics	   in	  Brussels	  
(Buckley	   and	   Howarth	   2011;	   Quaglia	   2011).	   The	   top	   echelons	   of	   the	   Commission,	   led	   by	  
President	  Barroso,	  began	   to	   favour	   regulation—seen	   in	   the	  decision	   to	  propose	   regulation	   for	  
credit	  rating	  agencies	  and	  AIFMs	  which	  the	  Commission	  had	  previously	  ruled	  out.	  The	  European	  
Parliament	   became	   particularly	   vocal	   on	   the	   need	   to	   regulate	   hedge	   funds,	   producing	   two	  
reports:	   the	   'Rasmussen'	   report	   and	   the	   'Lehne'	   report	   (EP	   2008a,b).	   An	   EP	   resolution	   on	   23	  
September	   2008	   requested	   the	   Commission	   to	   submit	   a	   legislative	   proposal	   or	   proposals	  
covering	   all	   relevant	   actors	   and	   financial	  market	   participants,	   including	   hedge	   fund	  managers	  
and	  private	  equity	  firms.	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In	   December	   2008,	   the	   Commission	   issued	   a	   consultation	   document	   discussing	   regulatory	  
measures	  for	  hedge	  funds.	  Most	  government	  respondents	  argued	  that	  an	  international	  or	  global	  
response	  would	  be	  superior	  to	  an	  EU	  response.	  But	  a	  small	  majority	  of	  government	  respondents	  
believed	   that	   it	   was	   nevertheless	   appropriate	   to	   move	   forward	   with	   EU-­‐level	   action.	   Many	  
respondents,	  most	   notably	   the	   French	   and	  German	   governments,	   argued	   that	   ‘Europe	   should	  
play	   an	   instrumental	   role	   in	   shaping	   a	   global	   regulatory	   regime	   for	   hedge	   funds	   through	   the	  
creation	  of	  a	  “European	  label”.	  An	  EU	  framework	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  reference	  for	  global	  regulation	  
of	  alternative	  investment	  management	  activity’	  (Commission	  2009b:	  8).	  
In	  June	  2009	  the	  Commission	  presented	  its	  draft	  directive	  on	  AIFMs,	  which	  covered	  managers	  of	  
hedge	   funds,	   private	   equities	   funds,	   and	   real	   estate	   funds	   (EC	   2009a).	   It	   introduced	   a	   legally	  
binding	  authorization	  and	   supervisory	   regime	   for	  all	  AIFMs	   in	   the	  EU,	   irrespective	  of	   the	   legal	  
domicile	  of	  the	  managed	  alternative	  investment	  fund.	  AIFMs	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  authorization	  
from	   the	   competent	   authority	   of	   the	   home	   member	   state	   and	   to	   reporting	   systemically	  
important	   data	   to	   supervisors.	   The	   draft	   directive	   recommended	   a	   European	   passport	   for	  
AIFMs:	  an	  AIFM	  authorized	  in	  its	  home	  member	  state	  would	  be	  entitled	  to	  market	  its	  funds	  to	  
professional	   investors	   in	   other	   member	   states,	   which	   would	   not	   be	   permitted	   to	   impose	  
additional	   requirements.	   The	   Commission’s	   initial	   draft	   directive	   had	   extensive,	   potential	  
extraterritorial	   effects,	   discussed	   in	   the	   following	   section.	   This	   was	   seen	   by	   some	   member	  
states,	   especially	   the	  UK,	   and	   the	  hedge	   funds	   industry	   as	   protectionist	   and	   likely	   to	   result	   in	  
retaliatory	   action	   from	   the	  US	   federal	   government	   (especially	   the	  provision	  on	   ‘equivalence’).	  
Other	  member	   states,	   first	   and	   foremost	   France	  and	  Germany,	   argued	   that	   such	  an	  approach	  
was	  necessary	   to	  prevent	  Europe	   from	  becoming	   ‘the	  Trojan	  horse	   for	  offshore	   funds’,	  as	   the	  
French	  finance	  minister	  put	  it	  (European	  Voice,	  29	  April	  2009).	  
The	  draft	  directive	  was	  revised	  following	   intense	   lobbying	  from	  affected	  financial	  service	  firms	  
(see	   Woll	   2012,	   2014)	   and	   the	   American	   and	   British	   governments.	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   most	  
controversial	   proposals,	   including	   plans	   to	   impose	   fixed	   caps	   on	   leverage	   and	   capital	  
requirements,	   were	   either	   removed	   or	   significantly	   watered	   down.	   AIFMD	   required	   fund	  
managers	   to	   appoint	   a	   separate	   custodian	   for	   hedge	   fund	   assets	   and	   provide	   independent	  
portfolio	  valuations,	  but	  this	  provision	  reflected	  what	  was	  already	  standard	  industry	  practice	  for	  
most	  funds	  operating	  in	  the	  EU.	  Questions	  remained	  over	  the	  power	  of	  the	  European	  Securities	  
Markets	  Authority	  (ESMA)	  in	  relation	  to	  national	  authorities	  in	  the	  authorization	  of	  AIFMs.	  While	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the	   reporting	   requirements	   imposed	   unwelcome,	   albeit	   limited,	   compliance	   costs	   on	   hedge	  
funds,	   their	  existing	  business	  practices	  were	  not	  affected	   in	  any	   significant	  way.	  Provisions	  on	  
third	  country	  access	  are	  considered	  below.	  
The	  adopted	  EU	  directive	  aligned	  closely	  to	  existing	  US	  legislation	  passed	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  
financial	   crisis,	   which	   observers	   have	   described	   as	   not	   onerous	   or	   likely	   to	   restrict	   existing	  
business	   activities	   (Brown	   et	   al.	   2010).	   The	   Dodd-­‐Frank	   Wall	   Street	   Reform	   and	   Consumer	  
Protection	  Act	  of	  July	  2009	  requires	  all	  hedge	  funds	  above	  a	  minimum	  size	  to	  register	  with	  the	  
Securities	   and	   Exchange	   Commission	   (SEC),	   imposes	   minimal	   reporting	   requirements,	   and	  
subjects	  funds	  to	  periodic	  SEC	  examinations	  and	  inspections.	  	  
To	  sum	  up,	  the	  main	  line	  of	  division	  on	  the	  regulation	  of	  hedge	  funds	  within	  the	  EU	  were	  rooted	  
in	  different	  financial	  systems.	  France,	  Germany,	  and	  Italy	  were	  worried	  about	  activist	  investors,	  
such	  as	  hedge	  fund	  managers	  and	  private	  equity	  firms,	  loosening	  the	  traditional	  finance-­‐industry	  
ties	  that	  enabled	  long-­‐term	  investment	  for	  manufacturing	  firms	  (Financial	  Times,	  30	  April	  2009;	  
for	   a	   similar	   argument	   see	   Zimmermann	   2010).	   For	   this	   reason,	   hedge	   funds	  were	   subject	   to	  
rather	  strict	  regulation	  in	  these	  countries	  prior	  to	  the	  crisis.	  Moreover,	  as	  Woll	  (2012,	  2014)	  has	  
pointed	   out,	   France	   hosted	   a	   thriving	   assets	   management	   industry	   including	   the	   largest	  
collective	   investment	   fund	   (UCITS)	   industry	   in	  Europe	   that	   competed	  with	  hedge	   funds.	  UCITS	  
were	   already	   heavily	   regulated	   in	   the	   EU	   and	   in	   certain	   respects	   competed	   for	   business	  with	  
hedge	  fund	  managers.	  
Prior	   to	   the	   crisis,	   the	   UK—which	   hosts	   four-­‐fifths	   of	   Europe’s	   hedge	   funds—opposed	   EU	  
regulation.	  But	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  crisis	  the	  British	  government	  relaxed	  its	  opposition,	  in	  part	  to	  
appease	  British	  public	  opinion	  (Helleiner	  and	  Pagliari	  2010).	  But	  British	  policy-­‐makers	  were	  also	  
concerned	  with	  how	  AIFMs	  would	  react	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  complying	  with	  EU	  rules	  and	  their	  threat	  
to	   relocate,	   endangering	   the	   primacy	   of	   London	   as	   a	   global	   financial	   centre.	   As	   London	  
competes	  with	  other	  financial	  centres	  worldwide	  to	  attract	  business,	  concern	  for	   international	  
‘regulatory	   arbitrage’6	   has	   traditionally	   been	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   British	   policy-­‐makers’	   minds	  
(interviews,	  London,	  May	  2007,	  July	  2008).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  expression	   is	  used	  frequently	   in	  policy	  documents	  produced	  by	  the	  British	  Treasury,	  the	  FSA,	  and	  
the	  Bank	  of	  England.	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The	  debate	  on	  third	  country	  access	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  equivalence	  
One	   of	   the	  most	   controversial	   issues	   during	   negotiations	   on	   the	   directive	  was	   ‘third-­‐country’	  
access:	   the	   rules	   according	   to	   which	   the	   managers	   of	   non-­‐EU-­‐based	   funds—whether	   based	  
inside	   or	   outside	   the	   EU—can	   obtain	   the	   ‘EU	   passport’	   to	   market	   to	   professional	   investors	  
throughout	  the	  Union	  (Buckley	  and	  Howarth	  2011).	  This	  issue	  is	  important	  for	  the	  overall	  theme	  
of	  this	  volume	  because,	  given	  the	  absence	  of	  robust	  rules	  on	  hedge	  funds	  at	  the	   international	  
level,	  domestic	  rules	   in	  the	  main	   jurisdictions,	  namely	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  USA,	  are	  paramount	  for	  
their	   governance.	   The	   interaction	   between	   hedge	   fund	   rules	   in	   these	   jurisdictions	   moreover	  
poses	  potential	  problems	  for	  future	  regulation.	  	  
In	  the	  making	  of	  the	  AIFM	  directive,	  the	  French	  government	  in	  particular	  sought	  to	  restrict	  the	  
ability	  of	  funds	  based	  in	  low	  tax	  jurisdictions	  (whether	  managed	  in	  the	  EU	  or	  not)	  to	  access	  its	  
market.	   The	   French	   argued	   that	   the	   passport	   should	   be	   granted	   to	   the	  managers	   of	   non-­‐EU	  
based	  funds	  only	  when	  the	  applicable	  regulatory	  regime	  is	  deemed	  equivalent	  to	  that	  of	  the	  EU	  
(Financial	  Times,	  14	  April	  2010).	  Many	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  in	  particular	  Socialist	  MEPS,	  
were	  in	  favour	  of	  similarly	  tough	  rules.	  	  
As	  noted	  above,	  the	  British	  and	  American	  governments,	  amongst	  others,	  together	  with	  the	  fund	  
management	  industry,	  challenged	  these	  proposals	  as	  protectionist.	  The	  US	  administration	  made	  
very	   public	   its	   opposition	   to	   the	   ‘third	   country’	   element	   in	   the	   proposed	   directive	   and	   its	  
perception	  of	   EU	  efforts	   to	   dictate	   the	   global	   regulatory	   landscape.	   The	  US	  SEC	   stated	   that	   it	  
would	  probably	  be	  unable	   to	   comply	  with	   the	  equivalence	  criteria	   suggested	   in	  AIFMD	  drafts,	  
which	  would	  close	  the	  EU	  market	  to	  US-­‐based	  funds	  (Harris	  2010).	  	  
A	   1	  March	   letter	   from	  US	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Treasury	   Timothy	   Geithner	   to	  Michel	   Barnier,	   the	  
Commissioner	  for	  Internal	  Market	  and	  Services	  and	  the	  Spanish	  chair	  of	  the	  Ecofin	  Council,	  was	  
leaked	  to	  the	  press	  and	  published	  in	  full	  in	  the	  Financial	  Times	  (11	  March	  2010).	  So	  was	  a	  5	  April	  
letter	  from	  Mr	  Geithner	  to	  the	  UK	  Chancellor	  of	  the	  Exchequer	  Alistair	  Darling	  and	  the	  German,	  
French,	  and	  Spanish	  finance	  ministers	  enjoining	  them	  to	  reconsider	  the	  AIFMD	  (Financial	  Times,	  
6	  April	  2010).	  In	  the	  1	  March	  letter,	  Mr	  Geithner	  notes:	  	  
…	  I	  believe	  we	  agree	  that	  [it]	  is	  essential	  to	  fulfill	  our	  G-­‐20	  commitment	  
to	   avoid	   discrimination	   and	   maintain	   a	   level	   playing	   field.	   In	   this	  
context,	   we	   are	   concerned	   with	   various	   proposals	   that	   would	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discriminate	   against	   US	   firms	   and	   deny	   them	   the	   access	   to	   the	   EU	  
market	   that	   they	  currently	  have.	  We	  strongly	  hope	   that	   the	   rule	   that	  
you	   put	   in	   place	   will	   ensure	   that	   non-­‐EU	   fund	   managers	   and	   global	  
custodian	   banks	   have	   the	   same	   access	   as	   their	   EU	   counterparts.	   You	  
will	  see	  that	  our	  approach	  in	  the	  US	  maintains	  full	  access	  for	  EU	  fund	  
managers	   and	   custodians	   to	   our	   market	   (Financial	   Times,	   11	   March	  
2010).	  	  
The	  USA	  stopped	  short	  of	  threatening	  retaliatory	  action.	  However,	   if	  the	  third	  country	  rules	  of	  
the	  directive	  were	  not	  significantly	  watered	  down,	  EU-­‐based	  fund	  managers	  could	  face	  reprisals	  
in	  the	  US	  Congress.	  Senior	  EU	  officials	  responded	  to	  US	  concerns	  by	  insisting	  that	  the	  proposed	  
directive	  was	   in	   line	  with	  G20	   guidelines	   to	   improve	   transparency	   in	   the	   financial	   system	  and	  
noted	  that	  Mr	  Barnier	  sought	  to	  work	  with	  the	  US	  administration	  to	  ensure	  ‘robust	  standards’	  
(Financial	  Times,	  12	  March	  2010).	  The	  British	  Labour	  government	  joined	  forces	  with	  the	  Obama	  
administration	  to	  water	  down	  the	  demands	  imposed	  on	  third	  country	  funds.	  Many	  British	  AIFMs	  
ran	  funds	  which	  were	  based	  outside	  the	  EU	  for	  tax	  purposes.	  The	  British	  sought	  a	  regime	  that	  
allowed	   non-­‐EU	   funds	   to	   be	  marketed	   across	   the	   EU	   provided	   the	   jurisdiction	   in	   which	   they	  
were	   based	   had	   ‘equivalent’	   regulatory	   standards,	  with	   a	   relaxed	   set	   of	   criteria	   to	   determine	  
‘equivalence’.	   Ireland,	   the	   Czech	   Republic,	   Malta,	   Sweden,	   and	   Austria	   adopted	   similar	  
positions.	  
Industry	   associations	   echoed	   the	   concerns	   of	   the	   American	   Treasury	   secretary	   to	   the	   third	  
country	  proposal,	  warning	  of	  retaliatory	  action	  in	  non-­‐EU	  jurisdictions	  damaging	  to	  the	  interests	  
of	  EU-­‐based	  financial	  services	  firms	  (Financial	  Times,	  13	  May	  2010).	  The	  uncertainty	  also	  hit	  off-­‐
shore	  centres,	  including	  the	  Cayman	  Islands,	  which	  had	  already	  lost	  funds	  to	  onshore	  locations	  
in	   Europe.	   Despite	   the	   recent	   financial	   crisis,	   hedge	   and	   other	   funds	   in	   the	   EU	   enjoyed	  
significant	   growth	   in	   both	   total	   assets	   and,	   from	   early-­‐2009,	   the	   number	   of	   funds	   under	  
management	  (Financial	  Times,	  2	  May	  2010).	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  Channel	  Islands	  of	  Jersey	  and	  
Guernsey	  established	  a	  diplomatic	  mission	   in	  Brussels	   reflecting	   their	   governments’	   fears	   that	  
their	  financial	  services	  industry	  could	  be	  damaged	  by	  new	  EU	  regulations	  (Financial	  Times,	  3	  July	  
2010).	  Half	  of	  Jersey’s	  economy	  consisted	  of	  financial	  services.	  	  
With	   the	   failure	   to	   reach	   a	   compromise	   deal	   on	   the	   third	   country	   issue	   at	   the	   March	   2010	  
European	  Council,	  MEPs	  went	  ahead	  with	  their	  own	  efforts	  to	  produce	  a	  more	  acceptable	  draft.	  
Surprisingly,	  the	  Monetary	  and	  Economic	  Affairs	  Committee	  responsible	  for	  the	  directive	  shifted	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its	  views.	  The	  AIFMD	  rapporteur,	   the	  French	  conservative	  MEP	   Jean-­‐Paul	  Gauzès,	  put	   forward	  
compromise	  solutions	  more	  popular	  in	  the	  UK	  than	  in	  France	  (Financial	  Times,	  4	  April	  2010).	  The	  
committee	   organised	   discussions	   of	   a	   possible	   transitional	   arrangement	   on	   the	   issue;	   in	   the	  
intervening	  period,	  national	  rules	  would	  continue	  to	  apply.	  	  
In	   the	   end,	   the	  most	   controversial	   provisions	   of	   the	   draft	   directive	   were	   substantially	   scaled	  
back.	  The	  French	  government’s	  hard-­‐line	  position	  on	  third	  country	  funds	  lost	  support	  from	  other	  
member	  states.	  The	  existing	  system	  of	  individual	  market	  application	  was	  to	  continue	  until	  2015	  
(Griffiths	   2010).	   As	   before,	   third	   country	   managers	   wishing	   to	   market	   their	   funds	   in	   the	   EU	  
would	  have	  to	  do	  so	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  private	  placement	  regimes	  (PPRs)	  of	  the	  EU	  member	  
states	  into	  which	  they	  were	  marketing.	  Yet	  compliance	  with	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  AIFMD	  would	  
still	  be	  necessary	  (as	  summarized	  in	  Table	  1)	  and	  real	  burdens	  were	  imposed	  not	  only	  on	  non-­‐EU	  
based	  managers	  but	  also	  on	  third	  country	  supervisory	  authorities.	  
	  
<Place	  Table	  1	  about	  here>	  
Table	  1:	  Necessary	  Compliance	  with	  AIFMD	  from	  2013	  	  
	   Imposition	  on	  manager	   Imposition	  on	  third	  country	  
authorities	  
EU	  manager	  with	  
third	  country	  
fund	  (not	  
marketed	  in	  the	  
EU)	  
Full	  compliance	  with	  AIFMD,	  
except	  depositary	  and	  annual	  
reporting	  requirements.	  
Cooperation	  arrangements	  between	  
supervisory	  authorities	  and	  the	  
competent	  authorities	  of	  the	  country	  
of	  domicile	  of	  the	  EU	  manager.	  	  
EU	  manager	  with	  
third	  country	  
fund	  (marketed	  
in	  the	  EU)	  
Full	  compliance	  with	  AIFMD,	  
except	  depositary	  
requirements.	  
Cooperation	  arrangements	  between	  
supervisory	  authorities	  and	  the	  
competent	  authorities	  of	  the	  country	  
of	  domicile	  of	  the	  EU	  manager.	  	  
Third	  country	  fund	  must	  not	  be	  
domiciled	  in	  a	  so-­‐called	  Non-­‐
Cooperative	  Country	  and	  Territory	  
(NCCT)	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  
Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force.	  
Third	  country	   Annual	  report	  for	  each	  fund.	   Cooperation	  arrangements	  between	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manager	  with	  EU	  
fund	  or	  a	  third	  
country	  fund	  
(marketed	  in	  the	  
EU)	  
Rules	  on	  improved	  disclosure	  to	  
investors	  on	  investment	  
strategy,	  risk	  factors,	  service	  
providers,	  and	  investors’	  fees	  
and	  expenses.	  
Regular	  reporting	  to	  regulators	  
of	  markets	  where	  manager	  
trades.	  	  
Where	  a	  fund	  acquires	  control	  
of	  a	  non-­‐listed	  company,	  
notification	  and	  reporting	  
requirements	  to	  the	  
shareholders	  of	  the	  company	  
and	  relevant	  regulators.	  	  
supervisory	  authorities	  where	  the	  
fund	  and	  manager	  are	  based	  and	  the	  
competent	  authorities	  in	  each	  EU	  
member	  state	  where	  the	  fund	  is	  to	  
be	  marketed.	  
Neither	  the	  fund	  nor	  the	  manager	  
should	  be	  domiciled	  in	  a	  NCCT.	  
	  
	  
A	  dual	   system	  of	  national	  PPRs	  and	  EU	  passports	  was	   to	  exist	  between	  2015	  and	  2018,	  when	  
ESMA	   would	   review	   the	   passport	   regime	   and	   consider	   recommending	   an	   end	   to	   the	   PPRs.	  
Nevertheless,	  member	  states	  would	  not	  be	  forced	  to	  adopt	  the	  passport	  in	  2018.	  If	  they	  were,	  a	  
passport	   to	   market	   in	   the	   EU	   would	   be	   required	   for	   all	   funds	   managed	   by	   third	   country	  
managers.	  	  
A	  two-­‐tiered	  system	  was	  thus	  to	  be	  introduced	  in	  2018.	  Funds	  managed	  within	  an	  EU	  member	  
state	  but	  domiciled	  outside	  would	  be	  eligible	   for	   a	  passport	  provided	   the	   country	  of	  domicile	  
met	  four	  conditions:	  that	  the	  foreign	  regulator	  supplies	  EU	  regulators	  with	  required	  information;	  
that	  the	  foreign	  jurisdiction	  allows	  European	  funds	  to	  be	  sold	  there;	  that	  regulation	  to	  prevent	  
money	   laundering	   and	   funding	   terrorism	   is	   in	   place;	   and	   that	   an	   acceptable	   tax	   agreement	  
exists.	  Were	  a	   jurisdiction	   to	   fall	   short	  on	   some	  of	   these	   standards,	   funds	  may	  still	  be	  able	   to	  
seek	  country-­‐by-­‐country	  marketing	  approval.	  But	  should	  a	  jurisdiction	  fall	  short	  on	  all	  of	  them,	  
the	  funds	  would	  be	  barred	  from	  being	  marketing	  in	  the	  EU.	  	  
Funds	   both	   domiciled	   and	   managed	   outside	   the	   EU	   would,	   after	   five	   years,	   have	   to	   meet	   a	  
higher	  standard	  to	  access	  the	  EU	  market—to	  obtain	  a	  passport,	  they	  would	  have	  to	  show	  that	  
their	  home	  jurisdiction	  had	  ‘equivalent’	  regulation	  to	  the	  EU	  (Financial	  Times,	  13	  May	  2010).	  The	  
policy	  on	   ‘equivalence’	  ended	  up	  reflecting	  policy	  already	  established	   in	   international	   financial	  
fora.	   The	   home	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   non-­‐EU	   funds	   applying	   for	   an	   EU	   passport	   would	   have	   to	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comply	  with	  IOSCO	  standards	  on	  hedge	  fund	  oversight,	  including	  compliance	  with	  international	  
tax	   and	   anti-­‐money	   laundering	   agreements.	   It	   was	   very	   likely	   that	   the	   USA	   and	   other	   key	  
markets	   would	   be	   deemed	   appropriately	   regulated	   jurisdictions	   (Plumridge	   2010).	  While	   this	  
compromise	  appeared	  to	  lower	  the	  hurdle	  for	  third	  country	  access,	  many	  investor	  and	  industry	  
groups	  remained	  concerned	  by	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘equivalent’,	  with	  conditions	  to	  be	  clarified	  by	  a	  
regulation	   implementing	   the	   directive.	   Critics	   also	   noted	   that	   funds	   investing	   in	   emerging	  
markets	  would	  find	  it	  hardest	  to	  comply,	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  EU	  investors	  to	  back	  fund	  
managers	   in	   African	   and	   other	   countries,	   with	   negative	   implications	   for	   growth	   in	   the	  
developing	  world	  (Financial	  Times,	  13	  May	  2010).	  
The	  fears	  of	  EU	  fund	  managers	  and	  the	  US	  Treasury	  resurfaced	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  2012	  following	  a	  
leak	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   draft	   regulation	   to	   adopt	   ‘Level	   2’	   measures	   (supplementary	   rules)	  
implementing	  the	  AIMFD,	  which	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  hawkish	  departure	  from	  the	  more	  flexible	  
position	  previously	  presented	  by	  ESMA	  in	  November	  2011	  (Financial	  Times,	  1	  April	  2012,	  11	  July	  
2012).	   The	   Commission	  was	   accused	   of	   reneging	   on	   the	   compromises	   of	   2010	   on	   a	   range	   of	  
matters	   (ibid.)	   including	   the	   definition	   of	   conditions	   that	   fund	  managers	   and	   funds	   in	   non-­‐EU	  
jurisdictions	  would	  have	  to	  meet	  to	  access	  EU	  investors.	  From	  April	  to	  December	  2012,	  industry	  
pressure	   helped	   redirect	   the	   Commission	   back	   towards	   the	   flexibility	   outlined	   in	   the	   ESMA	  
recommendations.	  On	  19	  December	  2012,	  the	  Commission	  adopted	  the	  ‘Level	  2’	  implementing	  
regulations	  for	  the	  AIFMD,	  finally	  approved	  unaltered	  by	  the	  Council	  and	  European	  Parliament	  
on	  15	  May	  2013	  (EC	  2013a,b).	  These	  Level	  2	  regulations	  were	  long	  anticipated	  by	  fund	  managers	  
and	   governments	   in	   Europe	   and	   abroad	   to	   clarify	   the	   conditions	   and	   procedures	   for	   the	  
authorization	  of	  AIFMs	  and	  to	  set	  out	  the	  rules	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  third	  country	  managers,	  funds,	  
and	   authorities,	   including	   conditions	   for	   delegation,	   rules	   on	   depositories,	   reporting	  
requirements,	  leverage	  calculation,	  and	  rules	  for	  cooperation	  arrangements.	  But	  a	  considerable	  
degree	  of	  uncertainty	  remained.	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  2013,	  top	  US	  Treasury	  officials	  expressed	  broad	  
satisfaction	  with	  the	  adopted	  Level	  2	  regulations	  that	  aligned	  broadly	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  
Dodd	   Frank	   Act	   (interview,	   Washington,	   6	   May	   2013).	   However,	   several	   US	   hedge	   fund	  
managers	  and	   their	   representative	   law	   firms	   continued	   to	  express	   the	   concern	   that	   tightened	  
reporting	   requirements	   would	   result	   in	   some	  managers	   withdrawing	   from	   the	   EU	   market	   or	  
opting	   not	   to	   enter	   it	   (Financial	   Times	   2	   June	   2013).	   	   There	  was	   no	   indication	   that	   the	   UK—
where	  the	  bulk	  of	  EU	  fund	  managers	  were	  based—would	  abolish	   its	  current	  national	  PPR.	  But	  
the	   possibility	   remained	   that	   the	   British	   government	   would	   apply	   additional	   AIFMD	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requirements	  on	  the	  home-­‐based	  managers	  of	  non-­‐EU	  funds	  and	  on	  third	  country-­‐based	  funds	  
and	  fund	  managers.	  
An	  overall	  assessment	  
Prior	  to	  the	  crisis,	  the	  international	  regulation	  of	  hedge	  funds	  was	  mostly	  ‘indirect’	  and	  the	  EU	  
lacked	  its	  own	  rules;	  hence	  there	  could	  be	  no	  formal	  linkage	  between	  EU	  and	  global	  rules.	  As	  for	  
ties	  between	  EU	  and	  global	   institutions,	   regulators	   from	  EU	  countries	   sat	   in	   IOSCO	  but	   IOSCO	  
only	   endorsed	   the	   indirect	   regulation	   of	   hedge	   funds.	   Within	   the	   EU	   and	   in	   international	  
financial	   regulatory	   fora,	   some	   national	   policy-­‐makers	   called	   for	   hedge	   fund	   regulation	   but	  
British	  and	  American	  policy-­‐makers	  blocked	  it.	  	  
In	  this	  period,	   the	  EU	  was	  a	   ‘policy-­‐taker’	   rather	  than	  a	  policy-­‐maker,	  waiting	  for	   international	  
rules	  to	  be	  agreed	  rather	  than	  setting	  its	  own	  rules	  on	  hedge	  funds.	  The	  EU,	  internally	  divided,	  
was	   unable	   to	   project	   its	   influence	   internationally	   or	   to	   call	   for	   international	   rules.	   Diverging	  
national	   preferences	   on	   regulating	   hedge	   funds	   were	   mostly	   rooted	   in	   different	   national	  
financial	  systems,	  which	  also	  hampered	  progress	  towards	  the	  establishment	  of	  EU	  rules.	  
After	   the	   onslaught	   of	   the	   crisis,	   continental	   policy-­‐makers	   grew	  more	   vocal	   on	   hedge	   funds	  
while	  US	  and	  UK	  policy-­‐makers	  endorsed	  G20	  commitments	  to	  regulate	  systemically	  important	  
hedge	   funds.	   At	   least	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   crisis,	   the	   EU	   was	   better	   able	   to	   coordinate	   its	  
international	   influence,	  with	   its	  members	  meeting	   to	   agree	   on	   language	   prior	   to	  G20	   summit	  
meetings.	   The	   EU	   thus	   played	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   advancing	   the	   international	   regulation	   of	  
hedge	  funds,	  which	  came	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  USA	  mostly	  for	  domestic	  political	  
reasons	  (Helleiner	  and	  Pagliari	  2010).	  	  
Yet	   international	   rules	   remained	   ‘thin’,	   the	   often	   cited—but	   very	   general—G20	   commitment	  
and	  the	  vague	  IOSCO	  principles	  notwithstanding.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  EU	  moved	  ahead	  with	  its	  own	  
set	  of	  rules,	  the	  AIFM	  directive,	  while	  the	  US	  strengthened	  its	  own	  national	  legislation	  on	  hedge	  
funds.	  Even	  after	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  there	  are	  thus	  no	  formal	  linkages	  between	  European	  
and	  global	  rules	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  hedge	  funds.	  The	  main	  regulatory	  discussions	  have	  revolved	  
around	  the	  issue	  of	  third	  country	  access	  envisaged	  by	  EU	  and	  US	  legislation.	  
As	   for	   those	   factors	   encouraging	   or	   hampering	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   EU	   to	   project	   its	   regulatory	  
influence	   prior	   to	   the	   crisis,	   the	   literature	   (Simmons	   2001;	   Drezner	   2007)	   has	   most	   often	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focused	  on	  economic	  power	  (to	  be	  more	  precise,	  market	  size).	  For	  hedge	  funds,	  market	  size	  can	  
be	  measured	   in	   various	  ways.	   If	   one	   considers	  hedge	   fund	  managers,	  most	   are	   located	   in	   the	  
USA	  and,	  within	  the	  EU,	  in	  the	  UK.	  If	  one	  considers	  hedge	  funds,	  some	  are	  based	  in	  the	  US	  but	  
most	  are	   in	  tax	  havens.	  And	  although	   investment	   in	  hedge	  funds	   in	  more	  common	   in	  the	  USA	  
than	  in	  continental	  Europe,	  the	  financial	  markets	  which	  funds	  and	  managers	  can	  tap	  are	  more	  or	  
less	  the	  same	  size	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  EU.	  Considering	  all	  this,	  the	  market	  size	  for	  hedge	  funds	  is	  
not	   the	   main	   determinant	   of	   EU	   influence—or	   the	   lack	   thereof—on	   global	   regulation.	  While	  
market	  size	  remained	  constant	  before	  and	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  in	  the	  
wake	  of	  the	  crisis	  the	  EU	  was	  able	  to	  set	  up	  its	  own	  rules	  on	  hedge	  funds—although	  it	  still	  had	  
limited	  influence	  on	  the	  work	  done	  in	  IOSCO.	  
Other	  authors	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  cross-­‐border	   integration	  and	  consolidation	  of	  the	  financial	  
industry	   altered	   industry	   coalitions	   supporting	   or	   opposing	   regulatory	   harmonization	   both	  
within	  and	  beyond	  the	  EU	  (Mügge	  2010).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  crucial	  point	  is	  that	  the	  entire	  hedge	  
fund	  industry—regardless	  of	  where	  it	  was	   located—opposed	  EU	  and	  international	  rules.	   In	  the	  
USA,	  it	  lobbied	  hard	  to	  maintain	  the	  weak	  regulatory	  template	  (based	  on	  a	  series	  of	  exemptions)	  
to	  which	   it	  was	   subject	   (Horsfield-­‐Bradbury	  2008).	  However,	   the	   financial	   crisis	  weakened	   the	  
industry’s	   ability	   to	   withstand	   regulatory	   reform.	   Pagliari	   (2012)	   notes	   that	   the	   hedge	   fund	  
industry	  deftly	  accepted	  the	  need	  for	  some	  form	  of	  public	  regulation	  and	  focused	  its	  efforts	  on	  
shaping	  the	  content	  of	  the	  new	  rules	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  burdensome	  requirements.	  
The	   main	   issue	   was	   that	   the	   EU	   lacked	   regulatory	   capacity	   (see	   Bach	   and	   Newmann	   2007;	  
Posner	  2009,	  2010).	  Prior	  to	  2009,	  member	  states	  had	  very	  different	  preferences	  and	  rules	  on	  
hedge	   funds,	  while	   there	  were	   no	   EU	   rules	   in	   place.	   After	   the	   crisis,	   the	   preferences	   of	   core	  
states	  (the	  UK)	  shifted	  and	  so	  did	  their	  bargaining	  power,	  at	  least	  temporarily.	  
The	  specific	  character	  of	  EU	  multi-­‐level	  governance	  weakened	  the	  EU’s	  international	  bargaining	  
power	   as	   divisions	   between	   its	   members	   prevented	   the	   formulation	   of	   clear	   policy	   positions	  
(Mügge	  2011).	  The	  EU	  was	  unable	  to	  project	  a	  strong	  voice	  with	  clearly	  articulated	  preferences	  
in	   international	   fora.	  After	   the	  outbreak	  of	   the	  crisis,	   the	  main	   channel	   through	  which	   the	  EU	  
was	  able	  to	  increase	  its	  international	  clout	  was	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  its	  own	  set	  of	  regional	  
rules,	  in	  particular	  the	  use	  of	  equivalence	  clauses.	  However,	  we	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  conditions	  
imposed	   by	   the	   AIMFD	   and	   its	   two	   implementing	   regulations	   create	   very	   limited	   additional	  
requirements	   on	   non-­‐EU	   based	   fund	   managers	   and	   supervisory	   authorities.	   The	   AIMFD	   also	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allows	   member	   states	   to	   maintain	   their	   own	   private	   placement	   regimes,	   ensuring	   the	  
continuation	  of	  divergence	  within	  the	  EU.	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